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Abstract: We show how an upstream rm by using a price-dependent prot-
sharing rule can prevent destructive competition between downstream rms that
produce relatively close substitutes. With this rule the upstream rm induces the
retailers to behave as if demand has become less price elastic. As a result, competing
downstream rms will maximize aggregate total channel prot. When downstream
rms are better informed about demand conditions than the upstream rm, the
same outcome cannot be achieved by vertical restraints such as resale price mainte-
nance (RPM). Price-dependent prot-sharing may also ensure that the downstream
rms undertake e¢ cient market expanding investments. The model is consistent
with observations from the market for content commodities distributed by mobile
networks.
1 Introduction
The Bertrand paradox may provide a plausible explanation of why the majority of
the content commodities on the internet are o¤ered for free (marginal costs). The
rival is just "one click away", and competing content providers have strong incentives
to undercut each other as long as there are positive prot margins.
In recent years mobile phone operators have allowed content providers to sell
content commodities like ringtones, football goal alerts and jokes to the mobile
subscribers. Similar to the internet, the entry barriers for providers of content
commodities are low, and the rival is just one click awayalso for mobile content
commodities. However, in contrast to what we have observed on the internet, mobile
content commodities are not o¤ered for free. End-user prices are well above marginal
costs.
The vertical channel structure for mobile content di¤ers from what is observed
in the internet. In contrast to the internet, the (upstream) mobile access provider
may use vertical restraints to reduce or eliminate competing content providersun-
dercutting incentives. One potential explanation why the Bertrand paradox is not
observed for such mobile content commodities, is the price-dependent prot-sharing
rule used as a vertical restraint by some upstream mobile providers. With this rule
each content provider decides the end-user price for the good he sells, but he has
to pay a share of the end-user price to the upstream rms in order to get access
to the customers on the mobile networks. The crucial feature of the rule is that
it is progressive, in the sense that the share maintained by the content provider is
increasing in the end-user price. Table 1 shows the prot-sharing rule used by the
dominant Norwegian mobile operator Telenor. If a content provider sells his good
for NOK 3, say, he receives 62 % of the revenue, while he only receives 45 % of the
revenue if he reduces the price to NOK 1.
End-user price (NOK) 1.0 1.5 3 5 10 20 70
Share to the content provider 45% 54.% 62% 66% 68% 70% 80%
Table 1: A price-dependent prot-sharing rule used for content messages downloaded by
mobile phones.
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A progressive prot-sharing rule implies that the opportunity cost of setting a
low end-user price is relatively high, and this reduces the incentives to engage in
erce price competition. More specically, in the formal model we show how an
upstream rm can use such a rule to reduce the content providersundercutting
incentives by lowering their perceived elasticity of demand. Thereby the upstream
rm can prevent destructive price competition. Even more interestingly, we show
that a progressive prot-sharing rule achieves higher aggregate channel prot than
alternatives where the upstream rm partly or fully dictates the end-user prices
(e.g. through resale price maintenance, RPM). This is true if we make the realistic
assumption that the content providers are better informed about the demand for
their goods than is the upstream rm (asymmetric information).
The labeling of the mobile provider as an upstream rm and the content providers
as downstream rms is not clear-cut in the present channel structure. The mobile
access provider o¤ers market access for multiple content providers. We choose to
label the content providers as downstream rms, since they decide retail pricing and
have more accurate information about retail demand conditions than the upstream
mobile provider.1
The question of how vertical restraints can help solve channel coordination prob-
lems has received much attention in the literature. Under di¤erent assumptions on
the channel structure McGuire and Staelin (1983), Sha¤er (1991), Ingene and Parry
(1995), Desai (2000) and Kuksov and Pazgal (2007) among others, show that a
two-part tari¤ may be used to prevent destructive downstream price competition.
However, our proposed prot-sharing rule achieves higher aggregate channel prot
1However, in comparable channel structures it may be more appropriate to label content
providers as upstream rms and access providers as downstream rms. One example is the book
publishing industry. When considering the relationship between a publisher and Amazon.com, the
latter decides retail pricing and probably also has superior information about the retail demand
conditions (and will in this sense be in the same marketing position as the content providers in our
settting). A similar information asymmetry may also be found in other industries where down-
stream rms have superior hands-on market knowledge. One example is chains consisting of a
large number of geographically dispersed outlets, and where local knowledge is hard to obtain for
the upstream headquarters.
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compared to a two-part tari¤ if the downstream rms have more accurate informa-
tion about demand than the upstream rm.
In an extension of the basic model, we allow the downstream rms to make
market-expanding investments that cannot be directly and perfectly controlled by
the upstream rm (for instance because the latter has insu¢ cient information about
the market potential). The investment levels might then be too high or too low
compared to the levels which maximize channel prot (e.g. Telser, 1960). Such
lack of control may give rise to horizontal and vertical externalities, and there exists
a sizeable literature on how vertical restraints can help solve channel coordination
problems. One strand of the literature focuses on how to nd the minimum number
of vertical restraints su¢ cient to maximize total channel prot. Mathewson and
Winter (1984) show how a combination of a two-part tari¤ and RPMmay be used to
achieve the integrated channel outcome where retailers undertake market expanding
sales e¤ort with potential spillovers. Lal (1990) shows that revenue-sharing may be
used as an additional instrument to a two-part tari¤ in a context where upstream
and downstream rms undertake non-contractible sales e¤orts (see also Rao and
Srinivasan,1995).
Another strand of the literature, pioneered by Rey and Tirole (1986), emphasizes
that both the private and social desirability of a given vertical restraint depend on
the underlying delegation problem. They compare RPM and exclusive territories
(ET) under uncertainty about demand or cost. Our starting point, too, is the under-
lying delegation problem; the retailers have more accurate demand information than
the manufacturer. We also follow Rey and Tirole (op cit) in that we do not search
for the minimum su¢ cient number of vertical restraints inducing the same prot
outcome as under channel integration. Rather we show how the price-dependent
prot-sharing rule may be used to suppress the competing retailersundercutting
incentives, and, furthermore, that this restraint may be superior to alternatives such
as RPM.
In contrast to our approach, Lal (1990) and recent papers like Cachon and Lariv-
iere (2005), Dana and Spier (2001), and Mortimer (2008), consider a revenue sharing
scheme that species xed rather than price-dependent shares to the manufacturer
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and the retailer (e.g. 60% to the manufacturer and 40 % to the retailer). Like our pa-
per, Cachon and Lariviere (2005), Dana and Spier (2001), and Mortimer (2008) are
motivated by observed contracts. These papers focus on revenue-sharing contracts
implemented in the video rental industry, and show how revenue-sharing schemes
may be used to solve channel coordinating problems related to inventory choices.
In the next section we present a case study of how the price-dependent prot-
sharing rule has been used in practise, and in Section 3 we set up a formal model
to show how an optimal prot-sharing rule may induce competing content providers
to choose end-user prices that maximize aggregate channel prot. In Section 4 we
extend the model to allow each downstream rm to undertake non-contractible mar-
ket expanding investments (e.g. marketing) with potential spillovers, and Section 5
concludes.
2 A price-dependent prot-sharing rule - used in
practice
Despite an awkward user interface, text-messaging has been an overwhelming success
in Europe and Asia.2 The average usage per month by customers in several European
countries exceeded sixty messages in 2004.3 In several markets, person-to-person
messaging has been followed by a successful deployment of content messaging, which
enables the mobile users to buy di¤erent types of content such as ringtones, music,
logos, alerts (e.g. goal alerts), jokes, quizzes and games, directory enquiries and so
forth.
In 1997, in the infancy of the market, the two Norwegian mobile providers Te-
lenor and NetCom introduced content messaging services like news, stock quotes
2By typing 7777 44 2 555 555 0 9 33 0 4 666 0 666 88 8 0 333 666 777 0 2 0 3 777 444 66 55
1111 on your Nokia mobile phone, you would be sending a text-message asking your friend Shall
we go out for a drink?.
3There is a striking discrepancy between Europe and the United States with respect to the take
up of text messaging. No text please, were Americanis the headline in The Economist (2003)
when focusing on this feature.
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and weather forecasts. The mobile access providers themselves decided which types
of services that should be o¤ered and they also took care of end-user pricing. How-
ever, this model of vertical integration did not seem to work very well; the services
generated limited revenues and prot.
In 2000, the two mobile providers voluntarily shifted strategy from in-house
development and production of content to one of vertical separation. With this
business model independent content providers behave as downstream rms ("retail-
ers") responsible for sales e¤ort, marketing, and end-user pricing, while the mo-
bile providers act as upstream rms providing access to the customers (the mobile
subscribers) as an input. The mobile providers o¤er take-it-or-leave-it wholesale
contracts, specifying a menu of end-user prices among which the content providers
may choose (ranging from NOK 1 to NOK 60). Moreover, the wholesale contract
species the revenue split between the mobile provider and the content provider,
where the share to the content provider increases with the end-user price (cf. Table
1 above).
Note that there is no competition between the mobile providers in the upstream
market for content messaging. In order to gain access to Telenors customers, a
provider of content message services needs an agreement with Telenor, and, similarly,
the content provider needs an agreement with NetCom in order to reach NetComs
customers. We have observed a high degree of cooperation between NetCom and
Telenor.4 In April 2000 the two mobile network providers launched a mechanism
that to a large extent was a common wholesale concept towards content message
providers. The outcome is that every mobile phone subscriber may access the same
content messaging services at the same price independent of which provider they
4One example is the introduction of common shortcodes. It is important for the content provider
to have the same number for all the mobile operators to facilitate marketing to all users. One of
the most important content messages has been TV-related text-messaging where viewers vote and
send comments. For such services it is important that the providers o¤er common shortcodes
(four-digit numbers) for all subscribers. NetCom and Telenor o¤ered common shortcodes from
2000, while common shortcodes were not o¤ered until 2002 in the majority of other European
countries. Common shortcodes have probably been the most important factor for the take-o¤ of
TV-related text messages (Economist, 2002).
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subscribe to. In the formal model below, we consequently assume that there is an
upstream monopoly selling access to a large number of independent retailers.
Content messaging became a success, and in 2004 the mobile customers on aver-
age bought 15 content messages per month in Norway. The total revenue generated
from content messaging (NOK 1 billion) was approximately 15% of the revenues
from mobile voice tra¢ c. Vertical separation through delegation of retail activities
such as retail pricing and marketing has been considered as a key feature behind
the success. The Norwegian business model with delegation of content provision to
independent rms is now widely adopted in Europe and Asia (Strand, 2004).
The motivation behind the mobile providersdelegation of retail pricing and mar-
keting was that small and independent content providers appeared to have superior
hands-on market knowledge (Nielsen and Aanestad, 2006). Consequently, there is a
potential gain from delegation since decisions on marketing, retail pricing and intro-
duction of new services may be based on more accurate demand information when
undertaken by independent content providers rather than by the mobile providers
themselves. In the formal model below, we thus assume that the source of the dele-
gation problem is that independent downstream rms have more accurate demand
information than the upstream rm.
By providing a standard interface and allowing for free entry for content providers,
the mobile environment resembles what we have observed in the internet. As Shapiro
and Varian (1998) put it: Any idiot can establish a Web presence and lots of
them have. In 2004, approximately 50 di¤erent companies were active in provid-
ing content messaging services in Norway (Nielsen and Aanestad, 2006). Due to
low entry barriers and the fact that the services may easily be replicated by rivals,
the vast majority of the content messaging services may be considered as commodi-
ties. However, a remarkable di¤erence from the internet is that competition among
providers of content messaging services has not driven prices down to marginal costs.
In Figure 1 we have the monthly average prices for content messages in the period
March 2000-July 2002.5
5In this period, we have monthly data on the total revenue from content messaging and the
number of content messages bought by Telenors customers. The average price is then calculated
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Figure 1: Average prices for mobile content services. Source: Telenor
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It is interesting to note that income from content messaging in the Norwegian
mobile networks in 2004 was twice as high as the revenues from internet ads.6 Since
content commodities are o¤ered for free on the internet, advertising is the only
revenue source for the majority of internet content providers. Our conjecture is that
the gross willingness to pay is signicantly higher for content commodities available
on the internet than for mobile content commodities like ringtones and jokes. As
total revenues are higher for mobile content commodities than for internet content
commodities, this indicates that a signicantly higher share of the potential channel
prot is extracted from mobile content commodities than from internet content
commodities.
Unfortunately, we only have detailed information about the Norwegian market,
and cannot compare the outcome for mobile content messaging with and without
the price-dependent prot sharing rule. Anecdotal evidence is, however, consistent
from total revenue/number of messages. We have no data on content messages bought by the
customers of the other Norwegian mobile provider NetCom. However, since the content providers
charge the same end-user price independent of which of the two mobile providers the customer
subscribes to, it seems reasonable to assume that the pattern in Figure 1 holds for the total
market. Moreover, Telenor had a market share of approximately 70% in this period.
6Calculated from statistics from the Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority.
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with our ndings. In the Swedish market, price-dependent prot sharing was not
used in the infancy of the market, and the average consumer spent signicantly
less on content messaging than the average Norwegian user (see The Swedish Post
and Telecommunication Agency, 2002). However, there are admittedly also other
potential explanations for this di¤erence between Norway and Sweden.
3 The model
We consider an upstream rm that sells access to distribution facilities to n down-
stream rms. The demand curve faced by downstream rm i = 1; :::; n is given by
qi = qi(a; p); where a is a demand parameter and p is the vector of prices charged
by the n downstream rms.7 The demand parameter a is known by the downstream
rms when they set end-user prices. The upstream rm knows that a is distributed
on the interval [a; a], but does not know its exact level.8 We assume that the demand
functions are well behaved and downward sloping in own price (@qi=@pi < 0). The
consumers perceive the goods sold by the downstream rms as imperfect substitutes
(@qi=@pj > 0):
Marginal costs both at the upstream and downstream levels are set equal to zero,
but this does not matter for the qualitative results (see discussion at the end of this
section). Hence, we can write total operating prot in the industry as
 =
nX
i=1
piqi(a; p): (1)
Below, we consider a two-stage game where the upstream rm at stage 1 de-
termines the wholesale conditions, and where the downstream rms subsequently
7With linear demand curves a is simply the intercept with the price axis.
8We should emphasize that the upstream rm may also have superior demand information
compared to the downstream rm regarding e.g. new product introduction. Chu (1992), Lariviere
and Padmanabhan, (1997), Desai and Srinivasan (1995), and Desai (2000), among others, analyze
demand screening and signaling where the manufacturer has private information about e.g. product
quality. This has been given attention; not least in the grocery markets where screening and
signaling have been considered as potential explanations for the existence of slotting allowances.
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compete in prices. Later, we shall investigate the consequences of allowing the
downstream rms to make market-expanding investments.
The upstream rm uses a prot-sharing rule where downstream rm i keeps
a share (pi) > 0 of its operating prot, while the upstream rm gets the share
[1  (pi)]. The literature conventionally assumes that the prot share is a constant;
i.e. 0 = 0 (see e.g. Lal, 1990). However, below we show that when the downstream
rms produce (imperfect) substitutes, it is optimal for the upstream rm to choose
0 > 0: This means that the share accruing to each downstream rm is increasing
in its end-user price. We label this as a price-dependent prot-sharing rule.
For the following analysis it is convenient to make the following denition:
Denition: i  
0(pi)
(pi)
pi:
The function i() is the elasticity of the prot share with respect to downstream
rm is price. Note that i is positive if and only if 
0(pi) > 0:
Stage 2
The prot level of downstream rm i equals
i = (pi)piqi   fi; (2)
where fi is a xed fee to the upstream rm.
At the last stage each rm solves pi = argmax i: Using the denition i 
0(pi)
(pi)
pi; this yields the rst-order conditions (FOCs)
qi + pi
@qi
@pi

+ iqi = 0: (3)
If  is constant we have 0 = i = 0: In this case  merely determines how operating
prots are split between the upstream and the downstream rms, and it does not
a¤ect the latterspricing decisions. This is clear from equation (3), where the second
term vanishes if i = 0: We then get the textbook result that a prot maximizing
price pi satises [qi + pi
@qi
@pi
] = 0; implying that we end up in a standard Bertrand
game:
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With i > 0 the second term on the left-hand side of equation (3) is positive,
such that the marginal prot at any given price is higher than if i = 0:
Proposition 1: The downstream rmsprot-maximizing prices are higher for
i > 0 compared to i = 0:
Dening "ii  piqi
@qi
@pi
as the price elasticity of demand for good i; we can rewrite
rst-order condition (3) as
"ii + i =  1: (4)
Equation (4) characterizes the prot-maximizing equilibrium price for rm i: It
is well known that revenue - and thus prot for a rm facing zero marginal costs
- is maximized by choosing a price for which the elasticity is equal to minus one,
other things equal. However, if i > 0 we see from (4) that the prot sharing rule
induces the downstream service provider to behave as if demand has become less
price elastic:
Proposition 2: A price-dependent prot-sharing rule with i > 0 reduces the
perceived elasticity of demand for the downstream rms, making them behave less
aggressively.
Stage 1
The upstream rm will use i to induce the downstream rms to set prices that
maximize total channel prot. The optimal price-dependent prot-sharing rule is
characterized by its price elasticity. To nd the optimal rule we rst derive the
hypothetical equilibrium with vertical integration (V I) and complete information
about the demand parameter a. Solving pi = argmax(p) yields the FOCs
qi + pi
@qi
@pi

+
X
j 6=i
pj
@qj
@pi
= 0 (i = 1; :::; n): (5)
The term in the square bracket of (5) measures the marginal prot on good i and
is analogous to the term in the square bracket of (3). The second term of (5)
internalizes the horizontal pecuniary externality when products are imperfect sub-
stitutes; other things equal, each downstream rm has incentives to set a relatively
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low end-user price in order to steal business from its competitors. Since the size of
this business-stealing e¤ect is larger the less di¤erentiated the downstream goods,
we shall now introduce !pji as a measure of the degree of substitutability between
services o¤ered by the downstream rms:
!pji =  
@qj
@pi

@qi
@pi
(6)
Hence, !pji measures by how much demand for good j increases per unit reduction
in demand for good i when pi increases: In total, the (n   1) rivals of rm i will
consequently increase their output by
X
j 6=i
!pji units per unit reduction of qi:
The larger !pji is, the higher pi should be set in order to maximize aggregate
channel prot, other things equal. The challenge for the upstream rm in a vertically
separated market structure is to set wholesale conditions that induce the downstream
rms to internalize this e¤ect at stage 2.
Inserting for !pji into (5) we can now characterize industry optimum as
qi + pi
@qi
@pi
 
 X
j 6=i
pj!
p
ji
!
@qi
@pi
= 0: (i = 1; :::; n): (7)
By imposing symmetry this expression can be reformulated as
1  (n  1)!pji

"ii =  1: (8)
Note that !pji = 0 if the goods are completely unrelated in demand: On the other
hand, if the goods are nearly perfect substitutes, the reduced demand for good i
due to an increase in pi enlarges total demand for all the other goods by (almost)
the same amount. Hence, since rm i has (n   1) rivals, each of them will sell
approximately 1=(n   1) units more per unit reduction of qi. In the limiting case
where the goods are perfect substitutes, we have !pji = 1=(n 1); making the square
bracket in (8) equal to zero.9 In the following we shall assume that there is at least a
perceivable di¤erentiation between the goods, implying that !pji 2 [0; 1=(n  1)i:We
9If the goods are perfect substitutes, we have "ii !  1 in a symmetric equilibrium (innitely
elastic demand for each good). Thus, equation (8) still holds, even if the term in the square bracket
is equal to zero.
11
can then solve (8) with respect to "ii to nd that the actual price elasticity of demand
for each good in channel optimum equals
"ii =  
1
1  (n  1)!pji
:
Inserting for "ii into (4) implies that the upstream rm should set i according
to
i = 
   1 + 1
1  (n  1)!pji
: (9)
In general, the derivatives @qj=@pi and @qi=pi depend on the price of the goods.
However, for a wide class of utility functions this is not true for the ratio !pji =
  (@qj=@pi) = (@qi=@pi), since we have the following result:
Proposition 3: For any homothetic utility function, !pji is independent of output
and prices in a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof: See Technical Appendix.
The important message from Proposition 3 is that with symmetry and homo-
thetic utility the upstream rm only needs information about the degree of substi-
tutability, as measured by (6), and not about the size of the market. Homothethic
utility is su¢ cient, but not necessary, for this result. It will also hold true for quasi-
linear quadratic utility functions as they yield demand functions that are linear in
prices.
In order to steal business from its competitors, each downstream rm would,
other things equal, have incentives to set a lower price than the one which maximizes
aggregate channel prot (since
@ (pi q

i )
@pi
< 0 if the goods are substitutes). However,
if the upstream rm uses the prot-sharing rule with i = 
 > 0; each downstream
rm will fully internalize the e¤ect its price has on the prot of the other rms.10
10The underlying assumption here is that the upstream rm has accurate information on price
sensitivities in the downstream market, but not on market size. One motivation for this may be
that the upstream rm through its market position is able to learn how the downstream market
responds to price competition. As to market size, the upstream rm may have an idea about the
total potential, whereas the downstream rm knows how much of the market potential it is able
to capture.
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Hence, the downstream rms will avoid destructive price competition also in cases
where the goods are minimally di¤erentiated.11 Only in the special case where a price
reduction of good i does not a¤ect demand for good j, do we have !pji = 
 = 0:12
We can state
Proposition 4: The prot-sharing rule with i =  induces downstream prices
that maximize aggregate channel prot.
The upstream rm might use a xed fee (fi) to capture prots from the down-
stream rms. The problem is that the determination of fi must be based on some
expectation of the size of the market. If the upstream rm charges a relatively high
xed fee, the downstream rms will not enter the market unless actual demand is
su¢ ciently large. Then the industry will not be operative even if it should be intrin-
sically protable. If the upstream rm sets a relatively low xed fee, on the other
hand, it will capture only a small share of total industry prot if actual demand is
high.13
To circumvent this problem, the upstream rm can set fi = 0 and use another
instrument to redistribute prots. As an example, suppose that the upstream rm
sets (pi) = pi ; where  is a positive constant. The prot function of downstream
rm i can then be written as i = pi piqi: Thus the upstream rm can set 
arbitrarily close to zero (such that it becomes close to 100 per cent of aggregate
11Suppose that the goods are actually perfect substitutes. The upstream rm could then o¤er
each downstream rm the contract i = piqi   fi; where the xed fee is fi = " (where " is an
arbitrarily small number). If two or more downstream rms enter the industry, the equilibrium
price will be equal to zero, in which case they cannot cover the xed fee. However, by setting
 su¢ ciently above zero to ensure that i > 0 one, and only one, downstream rm will nd it
protable to enter the industry. As there are then no competing content providers, this rm will
set an output price which maximizes aggregate prot. Note also that the lower  is, the higher is
the share of the prots that accrues to the upstream rm.
12If the downstream goods were complements, optimal channel coordination would require a
prot-sharing function that is decreasing in prices ( < 0):
13If the upstream rm chooses to use a xed fee to capture prots from the downstream rms,
it will have to maximize its own prot with respect to  and f , taking into account the fact that
an otherwise protable industry is less likely to be operative the higher f is
13
channel prot), and still ensure that the downstream rms are operative for any
positive market demand. It should be noted, though, that since  is multiplied by
pi piqi instead of by piqi; the upstream rm cannot choose a value of  that guarantees
it a given percentage of the channel prot.14
What about other types of vertical restraints? The source of the problem is that
the downstream rms know the actual size of the market, while the upstream rm
only has an expectation about demand. The novelty of the price-dependent prot-
sharing rule is its ability to ensure that competing downstream rms individually
choose end-user prices which maximize total channel prot. The prot-sharing rule
is thus more e¤ective than alternatives that do not imply delegation of end-user
pricing, such as RPM. The present proposal is also more e¤ective than several other
alternatives even if these entail delegation of retail pricing. The most obvious exam-
ple is one where the upstream rms set a unit wholesale price that may deviate from
the marginal costs. By increasing the unit wholesale price above the marginal costs
(which are zero in the present model), the downstream rms will increase end-user
prices. However, analogous to RPM, the upstream rm must determine the unit
wholesale price based on expected rather than actual market size. Thus, it follows
from Proposition 3 that we have the following result:15
Proposition 5: Assume that only the downstream rms know the accurate level
of a. The prot-sharing rule where i = 
 is then superior to vertical restraints
14Suppose that the upstream rm wants to extract 50 % of the channel prot, which means that
p = 0:5: We then nd that it would have to set  =   (1=2) (p) : The problem is, however,
that due to the demand uncertainty at stage 1 the upstream rm does not know p: Thus, it is
also unable to calculate : We would like to thank one of the referees for pointing this out to us.
15It should be noted that an e¢ cient implementation of exclusive clauses (exclusive dealing or
exclusive territory) may resemble the current outcome. However, in many markets it is di¢ cult
to enforce exclusive contracts, and such exclusive contracts imply that the upstream rm picks
the rms/services that will be allowed to enter the retail market. Such restrictions on entry will
in many circumstances have signicant disadvantages. In fact, in the case of content messaging
discussed above, one of the key features behind the success seems to be that there are no such
restrictions on entry. The strategy of letting a thousand owers bloom has ensured a wide variety
of services which has made the system attractive for the consumers and protable for the industry.
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(such as RPM) that require the upstream rm to know the size of the market in
order to achieve maximum channel prot.
To clearly see the intuition behind the result in Proposition 5, we look at a specic
example. Our example is based on the Shubik-Levitan (1980) utility function:
U(q1::; qi; ::; qn) = a
nX
i=1
qi   n
2
0@(1  s) nX
i=1
q2i +
s
n
 
nX
i=1
qi
!21A : (10)
The parameter a > 0 in equation (10) is a measure of the market potential, qi is the
quantity from retailer i, and n  2 the number of retailers. The parameter s 2 [0; 1)
is a measure of how di¤erentiated the services are; from the consumerspoint of view
they are closer substitutes the higher s: The merit of using this particular utility
function is that the size of the market does not vary with s.16
Solving @U=@qi   pi = 0 for i = 1; ::::; n, we nd
qi =
1
n
 
a  pi
1  s +
s
(1  s)n
nX
j=1
pj
!
: (11)
When marginal costs are zero, it is straight forward to show that the price which
maximizes total channel prots is p = a=2 for i = 1; ::::; n. By using (6) and (11), we
nd that !pji = s= (n  s). Equation (9) then implies that  = s (n  1) = [n(1  s)] :
This generates an aggregate channel prot equal to  = 1
4
a2; which is rst-best from
the industrys point of view.17
In the absence of uncertainty there is actually no need for the upstream rm
to delegate retail pricing to the downstream rms. Abstracting from any legal
considerations, the upstream rm might for instance use RPM and set p = a=2 (and
redistribute prots through a xed fee). Alternatively, a two-part tari¤, consisting
16Other authors using the Shubik-Levitan framework to analyze vertical restraints include Sha¤er
(1991) and Motta (2004).
17From (11) we see that the derivatives @qi=@pi and @qj=@pi are independent of quantities.
This is a special feature of linear demand functions, which does not hold in general. However,
Proposition 3 makes it clear that the ratio !pij - which is the only market feature that matters
for the upstream rms choice of  - is independent of quantities and prices, also for the class of
homothetic utility functions.
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of a wholesale unit price wi and a xed fee fi, could be used. To see the latter,
suppose that there are two downstream rms, each having prots equal to i =
(pi   wi)qi   fi.18 Then the upstream rm ensures that the downstream rms
choose p = a=2 by setting
w =

s
2  s

a
2
: (12)
Note that dw=ds > 0: The reason for this is that the closer substitutes the
downstream products are , the more ercly the downstream rms will compete. In
particular, there will be perfect competition between the downstream rms in the
limit where s  ! 1; and in this case we therefore have p = w = a=2: If s = 0; on the
other hand, each downstream rm is a de facto monopoly in the end-user market.
The upstream rms will then induce them to choose p = a=2 by setting w equal to
marginal costs (which we have normalized to zero).
To see the superiority of the prot-sharing rule when only the downstream rms
know the actual size of the market, suppose that the upstream rms best estimate of
the size of the market is that a is uniformly distributed on [a; a] : Expected demand
is thus equal to ae = (a+ a)=2: With the prot-sharing rule, the expected industry
prot from the upstream rms point of view is consequently given by
E =
1
a  a
Z a
a
a2
4
da =
aa
4
+
(a  a)2
12
: (13)
Also under RPM the upstream rm is fully capable of internalizing the price
competition between the rms, such that the end-user price pRPM will be indepen-
dent of s. However, since the upstream rm does not know the exact size of the
market, it will set pRPM = ae=2 (see Technical Appendix): This price will be higher
than the one which maximizes aggregate channel prot if the actual size of the mar-
ket is smaller than its expected value, a < ae, and too low if a > ae: In the Technical
Appendix we show that the di¤erence between aggregate channel prots under the
prot-sharing rule and RPM is
E  ERPM = (a  a)
2
48
: (14)
18Note that we have two prot distribution variables available (i and fi), but the upstream rm
only needs one. As argued above (below Proposition 4),  may be superior in order to redistribute
prot and to ensure that the downstream rms are operative.
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There is no uncertainty if a = a; and in this case RPM and the prot-sharing rule
naturally yield the same prot. However, the larger the span between a and a; the
higher the expected prots will be under the prot-sharing rule compared to RPM.
Under a two-part tari¤ we nd that the unit wholesale price equals
w =

s
2  s

ae
2
. (15)
Equations (12) and (15) make it clear that the unit wholesale price under certainty
and uncertainty are equivalent, except that the latter is based on expected rather
than actual market size. With w given by (15) we further have (with superscript
TP for two-part tari¤):
pTP =
ae
2
+
2 (1  s)
4  3s (a  a
e) : (16)
Other things equal, the rst term in (16) implies that the end-user price is too
high if a < ae; and vice versa. Note that this corresponds to the outcome under
RPM. However, a two-part tari¤ generally performs better than RPM. To see why,
note that the second term in (16) adjusts for the di¤erence between actual and
expected demand. Indeed, for s = 0 we have the rst-best outcome pTP = a=2:
This simply reects the well-known fact that a two-part tari¤ between an upstream
rm and a downstream monopoly maximizes aggregate prot if the unit wholesale
price is set equal to the upstream rms marginal costs (thus w = 0 for s = 0; c.f.
equation (15)). This is true for any market size, and the downstream rms will
therefore use their pricing discretion to set pTP = a=2: For s ! 1; on the other
hand, the downstream rms have no individual market power. They must therefore
set pTP = w = ae=2: On this background it is not surprising that we nd that a
two-part tari¤ is weakly inferior to the prot-sharing rule but weakly superior to
RPM (see Technical Appendix for a formal proof):
E  ETP = s
2
(4  3s)2

a  a
48
2
> 0 for s > 0 (17)
and ETP   ERPM = (1  s) (2  s)
6 (4  3s)2 (a  a)
2 > 0 for s < 1: (18)
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For s 2 (0; 1) we thus have E > ETP > ERPM : Intuitively, the prot-
sharing rule achieves a higher expected prot than both RPM and a two-part tari¤,
since it (a) fully internalizes the pricing externalities between the downstream rms,
and (b) delegates the pricing decisions completely to the best informed players.
Under RPM there is no delegation of pricing decisions, and this rule yields the
lowest prot.19
The price-dependent prot sharing rule may be generalized to settings with pos-
itive marginal costs. To see this, assume that upstream and downstream marginal
costs are given by c and d, respectively, and that the upstream rm o¤ers down-
stream rm i the prot level i = (Mi)Miqi   fi, where Mi = pi   d   c. Then
the downstream rmsFOCs at stage 2 resemble (3). Thus, the sharing rule (Mi)
can be used at stage 1 to achieve the optimal channel outcome in the same way as
with zero marginal costs. However, with positive marginal costs, and in particular
with positive downstream marginal costs, the monitoring problem arising with prot
sharing will in practise become more complex (see discussion in the Concluding re-
marks).
It should be noted that the prot-sharing rule is not always superior to RPM
and two-part tari¤s. RPM may for instance perform better than the prot-sharing
rule if the upstream rm is relatively well informed about the size of the market
but uncertain about whether the downstream rms will tacitly collude when they
set end-user prices. Other things equal, such collusive behavior might induce the
downstream rms to set higher prices than those maximizing aggregate channel
prot.20 Which vertical restraint that is most e¢ cient from the channels point of
view will thus vary from case to case.
19In equations (14) and (17) we have implicitly assumed that w and pRPM under two-part tari¤
and RPM, respectively, are su¢ ciently low that the downstream rm chooses to be operative even
if actual demand should be in the neighborhood of a:
20An appendix with an illustrative example is available from the authors on request.
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4 Market-expanding investments
We now extend the model to allow each downstream rm to undertake non-contractible
market-expanding (or quality-enhancing) investments with potential spillovers. At
the outset, it is not clear how one rms investments a¤ect sales and prots of the
other rms. The investing rms product will typically become relatively more at-
tractive than those of the rivals. Thereby the latter could be harmed. However,
there might also be technological or marketing spillovers from an investment such
that one rms investment is to the benet of all the downstream rms. A given
rms marketing of ringtones, for instance, is likely to benet also other rms selling
ringtone services. We thus open up for both positive and negative spillovers from
investments, and let the downstream prot function of rm i be given by
i = (pi)piqi(a; p; x)  '(xi)  fi: (19)
The variable x in (19) denotes the vector of market-expanding investments under-
taken by the n downstream rms, and '(xi) is the investment cost function. The
more a rm invests, the higher is the demand it faces; @qi=@xi > 0: Investments
thus increase the size of the market beyond the initial exogenous market size a: We
assume that '0(xi) > 0, and that it is su¢ ciently convex to satisfy all second-order
conditions for a prot maximum. It should be noted that if the downstream rms
undertake market-expanding investments, the participation constraint may require
setting fi < 0 (slotting fee).
The upstream rm determines the access conditions at stage 1, and at stage 2
the downstream rms decide non-cooperatively on end-user prices and investment
levels.21 Without loss of generality, it is now instructive to assume an isoelastoc
prot-sharing rule. As above, we therefore let (pi) = ip
i
i ; where i > 0:
At stage 2 the rst-order condition @i=@pi = 0 is still given by equation (3),
21If we had considered contractible investments, it might be natural to assume that this activity
takes place at stage 1. Non-contractible investments, on the other hand, should be modelled as
taking place in the last stage, since it has no commitment value.
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which for convenience is repeated here and where the elasticity i is replaced by i:
qi + pi
@qi
@pi

+ iqi = 0:
Since i does not enter into this rst-order condition, we argued in the previous
section that it did not have any strategic value. Thus i could be used as a pure
prot distribution parameter, with no inuence on channel performance. This is no
longer true when the downstream rms can make market expanding investments, as
we then have:
@i
@xi
= i (p

i )
i+1 @qi
@xi
  '0(xi ): (20)
Downstream rm is marginal protability of investing is thus strictly increasing in
. In general, aggregate channel prot is a hump-shaped function of i; a too high
value of i yields overinvestment, while a too low value yields underinvestment.
As for now, we abstract from uncertainty. Using xed fees to redistribute prots,
the upstream rm will choose i and i to maximize aggregate channel prot, which
is given by
 =
nX
i=1
[piqi(a; p; x)  '(xi)] : (21)
To nd the optimal value of i; solving @=@xi = 0 yields
pi
@qi
@xi
+
X
j 6=i
pj
@qj
@xi
= '0(xi) (i = 1; :::; n): (22)
An investment which e.g. increases the quality of good i might a¤ect demand for
the other goods negatively, tending to make @qj=@xi < 0. This e¤ect is not taken
into account by independent downstream rms, and could imply that there will be
overinvestments in a decentralized market structure compared to what maximizes
aggregate channel prot. However, if one rms investments increase demand for its
rivals as well, for instance through technological and marketing spillovers, we have
@qj=@xi > 0:
Analogous to the procedure above, we dene !xji =
@qj
@xi

@qi
@xi
. The variable
!xji measures the increase in demand for good j per unit change in the demand for
good i resulting from a higher investment by downstream rm i:We have !xji = 1 in
the extreme case where one rms investment increases demand for all downstream
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goods by the same magnitude (@qi=@xi = @qj=@xi > 0), but otherwise we have
!xji < 1 (and !
x
ji is negative if @qj=@xi < 0 8i):
Imposing symmetry, we can now reformulate (22) as (with subscript V I for
vertical integration)
pV I

1 + (n  1)!xji
 @qi
@xi
= '0(xi): (23)
The rst-order condition @=@pi = 0 is still given by equation (8), so that
 =  depends on the substitutability between the goods. Clearly, aggregate
prot is maximized also in the decentralized market structure if it yields the same
prices and investment levels as under vertical integration. We can therefore use
equations (20) and (23) to nd that the upstream rm at stage 1 should set
i   =
1 + (n  1)!xji
p

V I
: (24)
The intuition for equation (24) is as follows. Suppose that investments primarily
have business-stealing e¤ects. Then the extra sales rm i gains when it invests are
approximately countered by correspondingly lower sales by the other downstream
rms (@qi=@xi    (n  1) @qj=@xi). Thus, investments are a waste of resources
from the channels point of view, and the upstream rm should set  close to zero.
However, the more benecial (or less negative) one rms investment is for its rivals,
the higher  should be set in order to maximize aggregate channel prot. This
explains why @=@!xji > 0:
It also follows from (24) that @=@pV I < 0; reecting the fact that a higher
end-user price increases the downstream rmsmarginal protability. This in turn
reduces the necessity of setting a high value of  in order to ensure that the down-
stream rms have su¢ ciently strong investment incentives:
We can state:
Proposition 6: Assume that both the upstream and the downstream rms know
the size of the market. Then the prot-sharing rule (pi) = ip
i
i with i = 
 and
i = 
 gives downstream pricing and investment incentives conducive to maximum
total channel prot.
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As in the basic model discussed in Section 3, it is unnecessary to delegate retail
pricing to the downstream rms if the upstream rm is equally well informed about
the size of the market. A three-part tari¤, where the upstream rm chooses ; a unit
wholesale price w and a xed fee would be a perfect substitute. Another alternative
is RPM, with downstream prots equal to i = 
RPM
i p
RPM
i qi   '(xi)  fi. A proof
of the latter is available in the Technical Appendix.
Once we introduce uncertainty, RPM and three-part tari¤s may have negative
impacts both on pricing and investment decisions compared to the prot-sharing
rule. To see this, we shall in the remaining part of the paper return to our basic
assumption that the upstream rm does not know the exact value of a. A three-part
tari¤will typically perform better than RPM (cf. the example at the end of Section
3). However, in order to highlight the importance of delegating pricing decisions
to the informed players, we restrict our attention to comparing the prot-sharing
rule and RPM. It should be noted that in the presence of both investments and
uncertainty it is not possible to give a unique overall ranking of the alternative
vertical restraints.
For most well-behaved demand functions, the end-user price which maximizes
total channel prot is higher the larger the exogenous size of the market (a). This
has two important implications. First, under the prot-sharing rule, it implies that
d=da = (@=@pV I) (@pV I=@a) < 0: This is quite intuitive; the larger the size of the
market, the higher the end-user price will be, and the smaller is the optimal size of :
Second, under RPM, it is important to note that the upstream rms choice of pRPM
has a decisive e¤ect on the downstream rmsinvestment levels, since the marginal
protability of investing in market expansion is increasing with pRPM (under RPM
we have @i=@xi = 
RPM
i p
RPM
i @qi=@xi '0(xi)).22 If the realization a^ is higher than
the upstream rm expected (a^ > ae), it will therefore typically be the case that
pRPM < p^ and xRPM < x^; where p^ and x^ are the optimal price and investment level
if the market size is equal to a^. Likewise, if a^ < ae we typically have pRPM > p^ and
xRPM > x^ : Put di¤erently, RPM tends to yield too low prices and investment levels
22With linear demand curves the RPM-price completely determines the investment levels; see
Appendix.
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when demand is higher than the upstream rm expected, and vice versa.
The basic problem with RPM is that the pricing decision is made by the up-
stream rm rather than by the rms with hands-on market information. This is in
sharp contrast to what is the case under the prot-sharing rule, where the inherent
delegation-principle ensures that the downstream rms choose correct prices for any
given market size. The only distorting factor with this rule is that the upstream
rm must choose  in order to maximize expected prot (this distortion implies that
the prot-sharing rule cannot achieve rst-best either). As argued above,  should
be set at a lower value the larger the exogenous market size (d=da < 0). When
the upstream rm has to set  based on the expectation of market demand, the rule
therefore tends to yield too high investments compared to rst-best if the actual
value a^ > ae and too low investments if a^ < ae: However, the crucial feature of
the prot-sharing rule is that for any given realized market size, the end-user price
will be correct from the channels point of view.23 Particularly when the exogenous
market size di¤ers signicantly from its expected value, the prot-sharing rule is
therefore superior to RPM. To illustrate this, we now turn to a simple example.
Demand uncertainty; RPM versus prot-sharing. An example.
To allow the rms to make market-expanding investments, we modify the utility
function in equation (10) to
U(q1::; qi; ::; qn) =
nX
i=1
aiqi   n
2
24(1  s) nX
i=1
q2i +
s
n
 
nX
i=1
qi
!235 ; (25)
where ai = a + xi: Each downstream rm can increase the size of its market by
xi units by investing in e.g. marketing. The cost of doing so is given by '(xi) =
(=2)x2i ; where  is su¢ ciently large to ensure that all stability and second-order
conditions are satised. To make it simple we assume that there are only two rms
(n = 2) and that s = 2=3. We further assume that the upstream rm believes that
a = 2; 3 or 4 with equal probabilities:
23The realized market size is the sum of the exogenous market size and the expansion caused by
investments.
23
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the e¢ ciency of the prot-sharing rule
in delegating pricing decisions to informed market players. Table 2 therefore shows
the loss of prot relative to what could have been achieved if also the upstream
rm knew the size of the market (labelled potential prot). Column 2 in the table
compares actual to potential prot under RPM, while column 3 makes the same
comparison under the prot-sharing rule (see Technical Appendix for calculations).
- 0.8 %- 15.5 %
- 0.2 %- 1.6 %a = 4
- 0.6 %- 2.7 %a = 3
- 3.4 %Not
operative
a = 2
Profit
sharing
RPM
Actual profit relative to
potentialActual
exogenous
market size
Table 2: Protability performance
The rst thing to note from Table 2 is that RPM fails completely if a = 2; the
upstream rm makes a larger prot by setting a relatively high value of pRPM and
accept that the market will not be served for such a low market demand. Then the
industry will not be operative at all, and the loss of prot relative to the case with
no uncertainty is 100 %. The prot-sharing rule, on the other hand, fares relatively
well; the prot is only 3.4 % lower than what would have been achievable under
certainty. Such di¤erences in the ability to handle market uncertainty can clearly
be decisive for whether emerging and potentially protable industries take o¤.
If a = 3 or a = 4; the industry is operative both under RPM and the prot-
sharing rule, but the latter still performs signicantly better. Consistent with the
discussion above, it can be shown that the rms underinvest compared to industry
optimum under RPM when a > ae, while they overinvest under the prot-sharing
rule. However, the overinvestment in the latter case has a comparatively small
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impact on industry protability, since the downstream rms can adjust the end-user
price correspondingly. Indeed, unlike what is the case under RPM, the downstream
rms make the correct investments under the prot-sharing rule for any realized
market size (a+ x in our notation). This is why the last row in Table 2 shows that
the expected prot loss under prot sharing in our example is as small as 0.8 %,
compared to 15.5 % under RPM. As a comparison, it can be shown that the expected
prot loss under a three-part tari¤ is 1.3 %, and that the industry is operative also in
the low-demand state. However, this will not be the case if the demand uncertainty
is su¢ ciently large.24
5 Concluding remarks
A major problem in many network industries is that rms may end up with de-
structive competition because they produce relatively close substitutes. This may
prevent the rms from undertaking investments which could benet the industry in
aggregate. Such an outcome can be avoided by implementing a prot-sharing rule
which reduces the downstream rmsperceived elasticity of demand.
The market in the case at hand, content messaging such as ringtones, may not be
economically important as such. However, we believe that in general it is often the
case that downstream rms have better demand information than upstream rms.
In the paper we have illustrated why the price-dependent prot-sharing rule may
then be superior to two-part tari¤s, and two-part tari¤s superior to RPM.25
24As emphasized above, we cannot undertake a unique overall ranking between RPM, prot-
sharing and three-part tari¤s when we have both demand uncertainty and investments. Examples
can be constructed where three-part tari¤s yield the higher prot, but we have not been able to
nd cases where RPM performs better than the other two schemes we have considered.
25According to Blair and Lafontaine (2005) the majority of revenue/prot sharing rules within
franchising specify a constant percentage fee to the franchisor and the franchisee, respectively. Blair
and Lafontaine emphasize, however, that contracts where the percentage rate itself is a function
of sales levels are used. Contracts where the royalty rate declines or increases as outlet sales reach
specic target levels are observed, and this type of non-linearity in franchising contracts has become
more common (Blair and Lafontaine (2005, pp. 62-63).
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In general, a limitation of prot sharing is the costs of monitoring the retailers
revenue (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005, Mortimer, 2008, and Dana and Spier, 2001).
However, in the present case, this problem is rarely signicant, since the upstream
mobile provider collects the revenue from the end users. Another practical merit
of prot sharing schemes in markets with low marginal costs is that prot sharing
in that case approaches revenue sharing. In most situations it is easier to monitor
retail revenue than retail prot.
Throughout we have assumed an upstream monopoly, and upstream competition
may be a valuable extension of our model. Introducing upstream competition á la
McGuire and Staelin (1983) is quite straightforward in the present context. We will
then have n manufacturer-retailer pairs o¤ering imperfect substitutes to the end-
users. In this environment a price-dependent prot sharing rule will be a superior
tool to soften downstream competition compared to a two-part tari¤ (a combination
of a unit wholesale price and a xed fee) also under full information.26
We would emphasize that the ranking between the prot-sharing rule, RPM
and two-part tari¤s does not always hold. The motivation for this paper is to
show how the price-dependent prot-sharing rule can be used to prevent destructive
competition between downstream rms even if the upstream rm does not know the
size of the market. If the upstream rm is relatively well informed about the size of
the market but uncertain about whether the downstream rms will tacitly collude,
on the other hand, RPM may perform better than the prot-sharing rule.
In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we have only considered
symmetric equilibria in the formal model. An interesting avenue for future research
would be to analyze how the prot-sharing rule tackles asymmetries among the
downstream rms. Our conjecture is that the price-dependent prot sharing rule
performs better than e.g. a two-part tari¤ as long as the asymmetries are not too
signicant (and the downstream rms are better informed about the market size than
is the upstream rm). For larger asymmetries, it would be particularly interesting
to analyze adverse selection and moral hazard problems under the prot-sharing
26This is shown in an illustrative example with linear demand functions in the Appendix.
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rule.27
6 Technical Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 3:
Homothetic utility functions generate demand functions of the form qk = fk(p)y,
where p is an n-vector of prices, y is total expenditure on the n goods, and fk(p)
is homogeneous of degree  1 in prices. Consider an arbitrary state of the world A;
where demand for good i and j is given by qAi = fi(p
A)yA and qAj = fj(p
A)yA: We
then have  
!Pji
A
=  @fj(p
A)=@pi
@fi(pA)=@pi
:
Consider another arbitrary state B; where qBi = fi(p
B)yB; qBj = fj(p
B)yB and
 
!Pji
B
=  @fj(p
B)=@pi
@fi(pB)=@pi
:
With homothetic utility we have qBi = tfi(tp
B)yB and qBj = tfj(tp
B)yB for any
t > 0; which implies that
 
!Pji
B
=   @fj(tpB)=@pi = @fi(tpB)=@pi : A su¢ cient
(but not necessary) condition for allowing us to choose t such that tpB = pA is that
we in any given state have p1 = ::::pn. In a symmetric equilibrium we consequently
nd  
!Pji
B
=  @fj(tp
B)=@pi
@fi(tpB)=@pi
=  @fj(p
A)=@pi
@fi(pA)=@pi
=
 
!Pji
A
:
Q.E.D.
6.2 Calculation of expected prot in absence of investments
Expected prot under RPM
27Holmstrom (1979), Basu, Lal, Srinivasan and Staelin (1985), and Jeuland and Shugan (1983),
among others, analyze moral hazard problems in manufacturer-retailer channel structures, while
Demski and Sappington (1984), Lal and Staelin (1986), Desai (2000) and Desai and Srinivasan
(1995), among others, analyze channel coordination problems in presence of adverse selection
problems.
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With a uniformly distributed on [a; a] ; expected prots under RPM are equal to
ERPM = max
fp1;:::;png

1
a  a
Z a
a
X
piqi

da

; (A1)
where qi is given by equation (7).
Solving (A1) we nd a unique symmetric equilibrium with
pRPMi =
ae
2
and ERPM =
aa
4
+
(a  a)2
16
:
Expected prot under a two-part tari¤
Under a two-part tari¤, the prot level of each downstream rm is equal to
i =  (pi   wi) qi   fi: Solving @i=@pi = 0 simultaneously for the n downstream
rms we arrive at a symmetric equilibrium with
p =
a
2
+
2w (n  s)  as (n  1)
2 [(2  s)n  s] and q =
(a  w) (n  s)
n [(2  s)n  s] :
Expected channel prots from the upstream rms point of view is now given by
ETP = max
w

1
a  a
Z a
a
(npiqi) da

: (A2)
Solving (A2) yields
w =
ae
2
s (n  1)
n  s ; (A3)
which implies that
pTP =
ae
2
+
n (1  s)
n (2  s)  s (a  a
e) (A4)
and
ETP =
aa
4
+
 
1
12
  s
2 (n  1)2
48 [n (2  s)  s]2
!
(a  a)2 : (A5)
In the main text we have assumed that n = 2: Equation (12), which shows the unit
wholesale price under certainty, is found by setting n = 2 and ae = a into equation
(A3). Equations (14), (15) and (16) are similarly found by setting n = 2 into (A3),
(A4) and (A5).
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Note that
dETP
dn
=   (1  s) s
2 (n  1)
12 [(2  s)n  s]3 (a  a)
2 < 0:
The two-part tari¤ scheme under uncertainty thus performs better the smaller the
number of downstream rms; ETP will thus be lower than the one shown in the
main text if n > 2 (and will thus perform even worse compared to the prot-sharing
rule). However, the qualitative result that E > ETP > ERPM holds for any
value of n:
6.3 Calculation of potential prot and the corresponding
prot-sharing rule
Using the utility function given by equation (24) to solve @U=@qi  pi = 0 for n = 2,
we nd that consumer demand equals
qi =
1
2 (1  s)

ai   pi + s
2
((p1   a1) + (p2   a2))

; (A6)
where ai = a+ xi: We thus have
@qi
@pi
=   2  s
4 (1  s) ;
@qj
@pi
=
s
4 (1  s) => !
p
ij =
s
2  s : (A7)
Equation (A6) also implies that
@qi
@xi
=
2  s
4 (1  s) ;
@qj
@xi
=   s
4 (1  s) => !
x
ij =  
s
2  s : (A8)
The cost of market-expanding investments is equal to '(xi) = (=2)x2i :Assuming
that  is su¢ ciently large to ensure a unique and symmetric equilibrium, it follows
from (A6) that q = (a+x  p)=2:We can thus rewrite rst-order conditions (8) and
(22) for a vertically integrated rm with full market information as (a+ x  p) =2 
p=2 = 0 and p=2  x = 0: Solving these two equations simultaneously implies that
x =
a
4  1 and p
 =
4
4  1
a
2
: (A9)
Aggregate channel prot is equal to
 =
a2
4  1 : (A10)
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Using equations (9), (23), (A8) and (A9) with s = 2=3 we have  = 1 and
 =
4  1
4a
:
The upstream rm thus ensures that the two competing downstream rms choose
prices and investment levels that maximize aggregate prot by using the prot-
sharing rule i =
4 1
4a
p2i qi   2x2i   fi:28
In order to calculate potential prot in Table 2, we have used (A10) with  = 2:
6.4 Calculation of the prot-sharing rule under uncertainty
At stage 2 the downstream rms know actual demand. Solving @i=@pi = 0 and
@i=@xi = 0 for n = 2 and then imposing symmetry we nd respectively
 (2  s) p+1 4x (1  s) = 0 and 2 (1  s) (1 + ) (a+ x) p (2 (1  s) + 4  3s) = 0:
In the following we shall assume that s = 2=3: By setting  = s= [2(1  s)] = 1
we can solve the rst-order conditions to nd explicit solutions for the price and
investment level:
p(a) =
 p (  a)

and x(a) =
h
 p (  a)i2

: (A11)
Let v(k) denote the upstream rms probability that the exogenous demand
parameter is equal to a(k); k = 1; :::;m:29 Evaluated at these probabilities expected
prot is given by
Ev[ ~] = 2
mX
k=1
v(k)

p(a(k))q(a(k))  
2
x(a (k))2

; (A12)
where q(a(k)) can be found by inserting for p(a (k)) and x(a (k)) into equation (A6).
With  = 1 the upstream rm will at stage one solve ^ = argmaxEv(~) =Pm
k=1 v(k)(k): With the example used in Table 2 this yields ^  0:24; which can
28Note that this generally implies that  = [1  j!x12j] pq   2 (x)2   f and that the upstream
rm makes a prot equal to j!x12pqj net of any xed fees.
29In the example we have v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 1=3 and a(1) = 2; a(2) = 3; a(3) = 4:
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be used to calculate expected prots in equation (A12). Actual prots in state k can
likewise be found by setting  = ^ and calculate (k) = p(a(k))q(a(k))  
2
x(a(k))2:
To calculate expected potential prot, we may imagine that we have a stage 0
where demand is uncertain, while actual demand is revealed at stage 1. The latter
means that the upstream rm knows actual demand when it sets  and : At stage 0,
expected potential prots thereby equal 2
 Pm
v=1 v(k)[p
(k)q(k)  
2
x(k)2]

; where
q(k); p(k) and x(k) are given from equations (A6) and (A9) and are the prot
maximizing values for each market size.
6.5 Calculation of RPM under uncertainty
Under RPM the prot level of downstream rm i equals i = 
RPM
i p
RPM
i qi  
(=2)x2i   fi. At stage 2 the price level pi and the prot share i (for notational
simplicity we omit the superscript RPM from here on) have already been set by the
upstream rm. Using equation (A6) we have
@i
@xi
= pi
@qi
@xi
  xi: (A13)
With n = 2 we know from equation (A7) that @qi
@xi
= 2 s
4(1 s) , and solving @i=@xi = 0
we nd
xi = ipi
2  s
4 (1  s) : (A14)
The important lesson from equation (A14) is that apart from the exogenous
parameters s and ; the marginal protability of investing in market expansion is
completely determined through the upstream rms choice of pi and i: The invest-
ment incentives are in particular independent of the market size a; once pi and i
are determined. Thus, the upstream rm faces no uncertainty with respect to the
downstream rmsinvestment levels, and expected channel prot from the upstream
rms point of view at stage 1 can thus be written as
Ev[ ~] = pi
 
mX
k=1
v(k)qi(a(k))
!
  x2i :
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As before, v(k) is the upstream rms perceived probability for a = a(k): Solving
fpi; ig = argmax Ev[]; we nd a symmetric solution
pRPM =
 
mX
k=1
v(k)p(a(k))
!
and RPM = 2
1  s
2  s;
where p(a(k)) is the optimal price given that demand is equal to a(k):30 The up-
stream rm thus sets pRPM such that it is equal to the expected monopoly price
over all states, given by the sum of the state contingent prot maximizing prices,
one for each k; weighted by the likelihood that this state will occur.
Unlike what is the case under the prot-sharing rule - where the downstream
rms can react to actual market demand - we see that RPM is independent of a:
This reects the fact that RPM can only be used to adjust for the competitive
pressure between the downstream rms.
Inserting for pRPM and RPM we further nd
xRPM =
Pm
k=1 v(k)a(k)
4  1 :
Investments are thus proportional to expected market size, instead of being depen-
dent on the actual size of the market. All adjustments to actual demand (aact) being
di¤erent from expected demand will therefore take place through the quantities sold:
q(a(k)) =
aact (4  1)  (Pmk=1 v(k)a(k)) (2  1)
2 (4  1) : (A15)
Expected prots are equal to
Ev[] = 
(
Pm
k=1 v(k)a(k))
2
4  1 ;
while actual channel prots in each state are equal to (a(k)) = 2pRPMq(a(k))   
xRPM
2
:
Some comments on the calculation of RPM in Table 2
Using the example in Table 2, we nd that the upstream rm makes a higher
prot by accepting that the market will not be served if a = 2: The upstream rmwill
30From equation (A9) we know that this price is given by p = 44 1
a
2 :
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therefore at the outset be aware of the fact that the industry will be inoperative if a =
2; and will use this information to obtain higher prots. More precisely, this means
that the upstream rm solves pRPM = argmax
n
pi

v(2)q(2)
v(2)+v(3)
+ v(3)q(3)
v(2)+v(3)
  x2i
o
:
Expected prots are equal to 1
3
 0 + 1
3
(a(2)) + 1
3
(a(3)):
6.6 Upstream competition
In the main text we have assumed that we have a monopoly upstream rm. As
argued in Section 2 the actual upstream rms are not competitors in the market
which motivated the paper. Now we introduce upstream competition in a way that
resembles the decentralized market structure in McGuire and Staelin (1983). There
are two upstream rms (manufacturers) and two downstream rms (retailers), and
the two manufacturers produce di¤erentiated but competing products. Manufac-
turer mi distributes its products through retailer ri, where i = 1; 2. We thus have
two competing channels, labeled ch1 and ch2. This may be considered as the polar
case to the assumption of upstream monopoly made in the basic model. So how
does the prot-sharing rule perform relative to a two-part tari¤ as considered by
McGuire and Staelin? For the sake of the argument, we assume that all players
have accurate demand information. To simplify we use the Shubik-Levitan demand
function specied in (10), where n = 2. At stage 1 manufacturer mi decides the
wholesale contract towards ri, and we assume that mi o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it
contract to ri. At stage 2 the retailers compete in prices.
As a benchmark we consider the case where the manufacturers use a two-part
tari¤as in McGuire and Staelin (1983). At stage 2 ri decides pi in order to maximize
ri = (pi   wi) qi  fi, and it is straightforward to show that the stage 2 equilibrium
price pi is given by
pTPi =
2a (1  s) (4  s) + (2  s) [2 (2  s)wi + swj]
(4  3s) (4  s)
At stage 1 mi sets wi and fi such that ris participation constraint is binding;
i.e.(pi   wi) qi = fi: Manufacturer mi will thus maximize the channel prot for
chi given by chi = piqi. The equilibrium unit wholesale price wi becomes wi =
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[2a (1  s) s2] = [(2  s)D]  0, where D = 4 (1  s) (3  s) + (2  s)2.31 Stage 1
equilibrium price then becomes pTP = [4a (1  s) (2  s)] =D.
Let us now consider the case where manufacturer mi uses the price-dependent
prot sharing rule (pi) = ip
i
i . At stage 2 ri then maximizes i = i (pi)
1+i qi.
The FOCs resemble (3), and we nd that the stage 2 equilibrium prices are given
by
pPSi =
2a (1  s) (1 + i) (4  s+ 2j)
4 (1  s) (2 + i) (2 + j) + s2 (3 + i + j) (A16)
At stage 1 mi decides i in order to maximize channel prot chi = piqi. The pa-
rameter  may be used to redistribute prot. By rst solving @chi=@i = 0 and then
imposing symmetry (1 = 2 = ) we nd that 
 =

(2  s)p1  s  2 (1  s) [2 (1  s)].
Inserting for  into (A16) we nd pPS = a
s
 p
1  s  (1  s).32
The di¤erence in prices under the prot-sharing rule and RPM is given by
pPS   pTP = a S1   S2
s (16  20s+ 5s2) ;
where the terms S1 
p
1  s (16  20s+ 5s2) and S2  (1  s) (16  12s+ s2) are
both positive if s < 1:We now claim that S1  S2; such that pPS  pTP : To see this
most easily, note that S21 S22 = s5 (1  s) : This implies that pPS > pTP for s 2 (0; 1)
and pPS = pTP for s = 0 and s = 1: Thus, the prot-sharing rule yields higher prices
than a two-part tari¤ if the downstream rms produce imperfect substitutes. Since
it further is straight forward to show that pPS is smaller than the cartel price (
pM = a
2
), it follows that the prot-sharing rule yields higher prots than a two-part
tari¤ if s 2 (0; 1) :
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